Carole Divall

The Siege of Cadiz, part 3

General Graham

A fragment of a contemporary war diary

General Thomas Graham arrived in Cadiz on the 26th March 1810 to take command of the Anglo-British force which had been sent to reinforce the Spanish as they defended their city, the last stronghold in Andalucia, against the besieging 1st French Corps under Marshal Victor.

Marshal Victor

At this point men from the 94th and a Royal Artillery detachment were defending Matagorda, the most vulnerable of the outlying forts protecting Cadiz (see The Siege of Cadiz, part two).  For four weeks Graham believed the position could be held but on the 26th March, as the French increased their firepower against the beleagured fort, he reluctantly ordered the evacuation of Matagorda.

The next day he wrote to the prime minister, Lord Liverpool,

‘Matagorda has fallen, but not without a most creditable defence; indeed I should not have allowed it to be held so long without the hope of a different disposition of the naval means producing a favourable diversion…No change, however, took place on the morning of the 22nd in the situation of the gunboats, etc, whose fire was of no avail, and the evacuation was ordered…The Spaniards seem to have awakened from a dream of security by this event, having totally neglected all the suggestions of preparation which ought to have been made for the greater annoyance of the enemy and greater security of Puntales, whenever Matagorda could no longer keep them at a little difference…Now all is bustle…’

The British losses were considerable; sixty-four of the garrison of 160 were killed or wounded.

A map of Cadiz showing the essential points for this article

Having taken Matagorda, the French could now target Puntales.  Their fire also drove the allied shipping into the inner harbour.  Cadiz, however, remained out of range, as Graham demonstrated (to reassure the population) by firing a mortar in the opposite direction.

One complication for the allies was the presence of large numbers of French prisoners of war, taken by the Spanish at Bailen in July 1808 and held in hulks ever since.  As the Journal of the proceedings of the British Army serving at Cadiz and on the Island of Leon records,

‘At daybreak this morning [May 16th] it was discovered that a Hulk called the Castella with French prisoners on board had drifted on the sands to the westward of the Trocadero, a large party of the enemy both Cavalry and Infantry were assembled on the beach [illeg.] by every means in their power in getting the men from on board, some of whom were landed on a small boat, others swimming towards the shore, at the same time the French opened a severe fire against Puntales from all their Batteries near the Trocadero to protect the landing and divert the attention of the fort – the fire was returned by Spaniards and continued with little intermission the whole of the morning.’

Another attempt was made by the French prisoners on the night of the 18th.  Graham reckoned that 300 officers and 400 men in total made their escape and only wondered that it had not happened sooner.

In terms of relative strength, however, these reinforcements from the hulks were of little significance.  Although Victor had 17,500 men in the 1st Corps and 3,500 artillery, engineers and sappers, against him were 18,000 Spanish regulars and 8,000 Anglo-Portuguese, far more than were needed to defend Cadiz.  Unless the French Marshal could take Puntales and the other defensive positions, the size of his force was of little significance.  And even then, the narrowness of the Isthmus meant that without ships (which were not forthcoming) he would find it impossible to storm the town.

It now became necessary for the defenders to decide how to proceed.  The Duke of Alburquerque had surrendered his command and had sailed to England as Spanish Ambassador at the Court of St James.  Graham now had to deal with General Blake who was anxious to take offensive action against the enemy lines, as he explained in a memorandum he sent to Graham.

The Duke of Albequerque

Graham wrote to Lord Liverpool on the 9th June:

‘It is impossible for me to judge of the accuracy of the statement of the enemy’s force.  I think that of ours in this position greatly exaggerated.  The quality of the ground is spoken of; that of the troops must be taken into account, and the circumstances of the notorious dread of cavalry which the Spanish infantry entertain, and of the great superiority of the enemy in field artillery, must do away with any confidence in the greater numbers of our force, should it be possible to produce such, which I very much doubt. There is, too, the great probability of the enemy having sufficient time to collect a force from the eastward without weakening his cordon, and the great uncertainty of combinations so distant, and depending on naval operations, against the success of this plan…perhaps, the question should be confined to whether it is prudent at present to undertake any offensive operation, and whether this leisure time should not be diligently employed in completing the works begun for the defence of the position.’

Graham had an alternative strategy to offer to the Spanish.

‘In the answer which I shall send to General Blake, I shall avoid taking any share as should commit too far the troops under my command.

‘I shall at the same time state to him, as I have already done verbally to General Lacy [sic], how I think such a detachment as it is proposed to employ might be used with safety to create uneasiness to the enemy and to oblige him to draw troops from other quarters.’

What Graham suggested was a series of diversions which would indeed create uneasiness for Victor.  Although neither of Lacey’s expeditions, to Algesiras in July and Huelva in August, achieved any great military success, they distracted Victor from Cadiz.  Similarly, Blake’s activities in Murcia engaged the attention of Sebastiani and prevented him from linking up with Victor.  Even Lord Blayney’s expedition to Malaga, designed to disrupt French communications, achieved its short-term objective, although it ended in disaster.

The all-important point that Graham recognised, which the Spanish, adopting a narrower perspective of the situation, did not, was that keeping Victor occupied at Cadiz and creating diversions elsewhere in the south strengthened the position of the allies in the Peninsula as a whole.  Should an Anglo-Spanish army have taken on Victor and defeated him, there was every chance that the marshal would have retreated to Estremadura or even to Portugal.  Graham appreciated that such a move on Victor’s part would have seriously disrupted Wellington’s strategy in Portugal.  As it was, the French continued to hold their position behind their lines and Cadiz remained impregnable behind its defences.  Indeed, Graham was able to write to Wellington on the 2nd August:

‘Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Keats is now in command of the naval force on this station.  His abilities and professional character are such as to leave no doubt of everything being done that the means under his direction will allow of.’

With strong naval support to keep supply lines open, there was little Victor could do but sit and wait.

………to be continued………

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