Apr 01 2010
The 1810 Siege of Cadiz, part 2
The Siege of Cadiz (Part 2)
Fortifications at Cadiz
The French, having been halted in their conquest of Andalucia by the resistance of Cadiz, now had to evolve a strategy that would enable them to take this last bastion of Spanish independence. Not only the determination of the inhabitants but also the topography of the city, on the far end of a narrow spit of land, was against them. As Marshal Victor quickly realised, without boats the French were in a peculiarly difficult situation. (See “The Siege of Cadiz part 1).
Victor intially believed that his engineering and artillery experts would be able to achieve some success. He pushed forward along the high road crossing the Rio Santi Petri salt marshes, but the ground was too boggy and the Spanish defences at the destroyed Ponte Suazo too strong. He withdrew, therefore, to Chiclana, which was made the headquarters of the left wing, under General Ruffin, and focused his attention on La Caracca, with its arsenal, and the all-important fort of Puntales. Puntales itself was out of reach, but if the French took Matagorda they would be able to target Puntales with their guns.
The Bay of Cadiz showing Forts Puntales and Matagorda
Taking the wider view, however, there was an inbuilt weakness in Victor’s position. The force occupying Andalucia was 70,00o strong, but when detachments were sent elsewhere, to Estremadura for example, the remaining force was inadequate to hold the province. Furthermore, Marshal Soult was pre-occupied with civil administration rather than the business of taking Cadiz, ruling the province more like a viceroy than a commander-inchief, and showing little respect for Joseph Bonaparte as King of Spain. As the siege protracted into 1811, Victor would find his forces depleted by Soult’s activities.
Nevertheless, all was not well in Cadiz itself. There was a power struggle between the local junta of essence, under General Venegas, and the Regency which had been nominated by the Junta Central, the members of which had taken refuge in Cadiz after they had been ejected from Seville at the end of January. The local junta tried to extend its authority beyond Cadiz and also refused to re-equip the Duke of Alburquerque’s troops or fund the military hospital. There was a deplorable pettiness in these refusals, particularly as Alburquerque’s arrival had been crucial to Spanish resistance.
The Duke of Albequerque
At the end of February the Regency flexed its muscles. Venegas was made governor of Mexico, and departed, and the Duke of Alburquerque, governor of Cadiz. Nevertheless, the local junta refused to allow him to set up his headquarters within the city walls, or exercise command over the Cadiz militia. Eventually the Regency bought off the junta with the bribe of the port dues and other royal taxes. In return, the junta recognised the Regency as the legitimate power and agreed to pay and feed the garrison.
Although, at this point, the siege was essentially a Franco-Spanish affair, there had been an attempt by Britain to give help to the all-important port a year before. In January 1809 five thousand men were sent from England for the defence of Cadiz, while General Craddock, in Lisbon, was instructed to send troops there on his own initiative. Craddock sent four battalions and a company of artillery under major General Mackenzie, while the 40th, who were in Seville, were also to march for Cadiz. Not only were these troops refused entry to Cadiz but the force from England, under Sherbrooke, never sailed further than the Tagus.
A year later, however, the situation had changed dramatically, and early in February 1810 Wellington sent three British battalions, the 79th, 2/87th and 94th, and the 20th Portuguese of the Line under General William Stewart, to Cadiz. Wellington, insisted, however, that the troops should be disciplined only by their own officers, should not be detached from Cadiz, and should receive British rations from Spanish stores. (Talavera was still fresh in his memory.) At the same time, the 2/88th were sent from Gibraltar to aid the defence.
Strengthened by ships from both the British and Spanish navies, and Spanish gunboats, the defenders of Cadiz could now dig in for a long siege.
(Next month’s article, which I shall publish on 1st May, will focus on General Graham.)
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