Carole Divall

There has long been a tendency to denigrate the reputation of Sir John Moore, as does Oman when he accuses Napier of “defending Moore”; often this criticism is balanced by adulation of Wellington, or Sir Arthur Wellesley, as he was at the time of Moore’s death in January 1809.  It is interesting, therefore, to consider how the two men regarded each other when they came into contact in Portugal in 1808.

General Sir John Moore

Wellesley had just triumphed at Rolica and Vimeiro, but had been superseded first by Sir Harry Burrard and then by Sir Hew Dalrymple.  The position of Moore and Wellesley was similar, therefore, because Moore had also found himself subordinate to two generals who, although “both respectable and good men, are neither of them officers of such service as myself” – nor Wellesley, he might have added.

Moore heard of Wellesley’s victories on the 24th August.  He immediately wrote to congratulate him.  Although this letter is lost, since Moore did not keep a copy, Wellesley’s reply, written the same day, suggests what its tone must have been:

My dear General,

I am highly flattered and most obliged to you for your kind letter, which I have just received, and I assure you that nothing could have given me greater pleasure than to have assisted you in the performance of the service which my good fortune has allotted me.  At all events I wish that you had arrived a few days sooner, that you might by your influence have prevailed with those who prevented me from making all the use in my power of the victory which the troops had gained.  But you are not now too late, and I hope that you will soon come to headquarters and ascertain the state and means of this army, and state your opinions to the Commander-in-chief respecting the means to be adopted…”

There follows a paragraph outlining the difficulty of sustaining an army in Portugal, which leads into Wellesley’s frustration with the way Burrard and Dalrymple are conducting matters.

“Time in all these questions is a most important consideration.  In less than fortnight it will not be possible for a fleet to remain on the coast of Portugal, excepting in Lisbon or Oporto.  About the same period the rains will begin to fall, the troops must have tents, and the roads will become more difficult than they are at present.  All these circumstances appear to be forgotten, and we have done nothing since the 21st.  I am therefore very desirous indeed that you should come over here, and I assure you that you will find our situation to be well deserving your serious consideration, and the exercise of your influence for the purpose of setting us right. – I am, dear General,

yours most faithfully

Arthur Wellesley”

General Sir Arthur Wellesley, later to become Duke of Wellington

Thus we see that Wellesley identified Moore as an ally against the other two generals.

Moore would certainly have agreed with Wellesley that nothing had been done since the 21st.  As he wrote in his journal: “I went on shore on the 25th with General Hope, and proceeded with him to headquarters, where I arrived in the evening.  I was very sorry to find everything in the greatest confusion, and a very general discontent.  Sir Hew, though announced to the army, had not as yet taken the direction of it; much was still to be done by Sir Arthur Wellesley, and what was not done by him was not done at all…

“Sir Arthur’s wish was to have followed them [the French], in which case I believe he would have been in Lisbon next day; but Sir Harry Burrard would not allow him.  He had in the same manner been prevented by Sir Harry Burrard from attacking the French the day before at Torres Vedras.”

In Moore’s opinion, “Sir Arthur’s views on both occasions were extremely right.”

General Sir Hew Dalrymple

There is no doubt that Moore was impressed by Wellesley: “…seniority in the Army List is a bad guide in the choice of military commander.  Sir Arthur Wellesley seems to have conducted his operations with ability, and they have been crowned with success.  It is a pity, when so much has been thrown into his hands, that he has not been allowed to complete it, and the conduct of the Government on this occasion has been absurd to a degree.”

Moore also made clear to Dalrymple, and to Wellesley himself  that he “considered this as his [Sir Arthur's] expedition.  He ought to have the command of whatever was detached.”

On the 18th September Moore received another letter from Wellesley, written the previous day.  The crucial paragraph is the second.

“It appears to me quite impossible that we can go on as we are now constituted; the Commander-in-chief must be changed, and the country and the army naturally turn their eyes to you as their commander.  I understand, however, that you have lately had some unpleasant discussions with the King’s Ministers, the effect of which might be to prevent the adoption of an arrangement for the command of the army which in my opinion would be the best, and would enable you to render those services at this moment for which you are peculiarly qualified.  I wish you would allow me to talk to you respecting the discussions to which I have adverted, in order that I may endeavour to remove any trace which they may have left on the minds of the King’s Ministers, having the effect which I have supposed.”

Wellesley was referring to the sense of grievance which had been Moore’s reaction upon finding himself under the command of two generals with little or no experience of active service and high command.  He recognised that ministers had the right to employ what officers they pleased, but that he had “a right, in common with all officers who have served zealously and well, to expect to be treated with attention, and when employment is offered to me, that some regard should be had to my former services.”

This sense of chagrin had been intensified by the discovery (learnt from Colonel Gordon, the Duke of York’s military secretary and others) “that there had been much intriguing about the command.  Ministers had done everything in their power to give it to Sir Arthur Wellesley; but he was so young a lieutenant-general that the Duke had objected to it, and, afraid of disgusting the army and the nation by such an appointment, they had given it up.  Disappointed in their favourite object, they were determined it should not be given to me, and, to prevent the possiblity of its falling to me, Sir Harry Burrard was named as second.”

As the victim of this failed jobbery, it is no wonder that Moore spoke his mind so forcefully to Lord Castlereagh.

Moore agreed to Wellesley’s request for a meeting and found Sir Arthur anxious to make peace between Moore and the ministers.  “…that he was ceertain it was not the intention of Ministers to behave unkindly to me; he had so often heard them express their respect and goodwill for me; that Lord Castlereagh was cold and cautious, and there might have been awkwardness in employing me in command after what had passed in Sweden [where Moore had recently fallen foul of the mad King Gustavus] until some explanation had passed with that Court, and this I might have mistaken for offence.  He wished I would empower him to say to Ministers that, if nothing had been intended by them to displease me, I was sorry that I had been deceived and that I had expressed myself as I did, that at any rate I had forgotten it, and thought no more of it.”

In response, Moore told Wellesley, “My wish must naturally be to remove any impression which should prevent me from being employed, and I should be obliged to him, or any other friend who would be kind enough to do it…”  He added in his journal, “If he is sincere, and I have no reason to doubt him, his conduct is very kind.”

In fact, Wellesley’s intervention was not required.  Dalrymple and Burrard were recalled as a result of the Convention of Cintra, and on the 25th September Moore was appointed to command of the army.  Sir Arthur did not reach England until the 6th October.

As a final comment on two talented, but very different generals, it is interesting to consider Wellington’s much later evaluation of Moore’s subsequent campaign.  “In Sir John Moore’s camapign I can see but one error; when he advanced to Sahagun he should have considered it as a movement of retreat.”  In fact, if Wellington had been familiar with the content of a letter Moore wrote to Sir David Baird (“I mean to proceed bridle in hand; for if the bubble bursts and Madrid falls, we shall have a run for it.”) he would have realised that Moore was already thinking in exactly the way Welington would have approved.

Wellesley of course went on to a brilliantly successful military career, whilst General Sir John Moore was killed at Corruna…….

The tomb of General Sir John Moore in Corruna

[All quotations from "The Diary of Sir John Moore", volume II, edited by Major-General Sir J.F.Maurice]

__________________________________________

Trackback URI | Comments RSS